Note that in TETRA E2EE, the keys are generated by a Key Management Centre (KMC) or a Key Management Facility (KMF), not by the communicating users. This has been standardised by SFPG for TETRA. įor example, around 2003, E2EE has been proposed as an additional layer of encryption for GSM or TETRA, in addition to the existing radio encryption protecting the communication between the mobile device and the network infrastructure. The term "end-to-end encryption" originally only meant that the communication is never decrypted during its transport from the sender to the receiver. For example, data may be held unencrypted on the user's own device, or be accessible via their own app, if their login is compromised. It is important to note that E2EE alone does not guarantee privacy or security. This can be seen as a concern in many cases where privacy is very important, such as businesses whose reputation depends on their ability to protect third party data, negotiations and communications that are important enough to have a risk of targeted 'hacking' or surveillance, and where sensitive subjects such as health, and information about minors are involved. This allows the third party to provide search and other features, or to scan for illegal and unacceptable content, but also means they can be read and misused by anyone who has access to the stored messages on the third-party system, whether this is by design or via a backdoor.
It does not prevent the company itself from viewing the information, as they have the key and can simply decrypt this data. Server-side disk encryption simply prevents unauthorized users from viewing this information. Even if the messages are encrypted, they are only encrypted 'in transit', and are thus accessible by the service provider, regardless of whether server-side disk encryption is used. In many messaging systems, including email and many chat networks, messages pass through intermediaries and are stored by a third party, from which they are retrieved by the recipient.
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